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LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND THE PUBLIC
·INTEREST

John M. Payne*
SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES.
By Charles Haar. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp.
xiv, 256. $29.95.

Charles Haar, the Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law Emeritus
at the Harvard Law School and a certified elder statesman of the
housing and land-use community, was one of those scholar
politicians of the 1960s who spun out innovative theories in law re
views and then moved into government to see them applied. His
generation inspired mine to pursue law as a means to serve the pub
lic interest. But the days of the Kennedy brothers' Camelot are
long past. Today, big government and "big courts" alike are seen as
parts of the problem. In the more austere political climate of the
1990s, however, Charles Haar is not the least bit repentant, and he
has found a magnificent topic around which to reaffirm his faith in
the capacity of big government and, particularly, big courts to move
us collectively toward the just society. In Suburbs Under Siege:
Race, Space, and Audacious Judges, Professor Haar dissects New
Jersey's famous Mount Laurel cases,1 finding in them not only a
compelling demonstration of judicial success in the arduous task of
law reform, but confirmation that courts can be better than legisla
tures at such a task.

Suburbs Under Siege is a very welcome book. For too long,
commentary on the Mount Laurel doctrine, one of the most impor
tant social initiatives of our time, has been left in the hands of peo
ple like myself who are day-to-day players at the grassroots level,
and who therefore inevitably risk commenting with an advocate's
bias.2 Charles Haar brings into the conversation not only his wealth
* Professor of Law and Justice Frederick Hall Scholar, Rutgers, Newark. B.A. 1963,
Yale; J.D. 1970, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(NJ. 1975) (Mount Laurel I); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (NJ. 1983) (Mount Laurel II).
2. Of course, I am now going to co=ent on Professor Haar's book from my perspective
as a day-to-day player, and so it is only fair that I su=arize briefly my involvement with this
issue. I had no lawyer's role whatsoever in the first and second Mount Laurel cases them
selves, but from 1983 onwards, I served as co-counsel to the public-interest plaintiffs in Urban
League of Greater New Brunswick, see infra note 27. Urban League was one of the first fully
litigated cases under the Mount Laurel II rules and it therefore became the laboratory for
distilling into workable form many of the bold but untested remedies that had been author-
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of experience and formidable analytic skill, but also his fresh per
spective. He renewed my faith in what I have been doing for the
past two decades. There was an unmistakable goodness about the
best of the 1960s commitment to social reform through law, and
that goodness pervades Suburbs Under Siege. If Professor Haar's
vision sometimes exceeds his grasp, then as now, his unshakable
conviction that humankind is perfectible and that lawsuits can lead
the way reminds me of why I decided to become a public-interest
lawyer in the first place. The book is about late-century land-use
law, but it should be read by anyone who wishes to understand the
heart and soul of postwar legal liberalism.
Despite my enthusiasm for Suburbs Under Siege, however, I
have two fundamental disagreements with Professor Haar's ap
proach to the Mount Laurel saga. Our differences are important,
because the Mount Laurel doctrine has not traveled well beyond
New Jersey, and it is important to understand why.3 He and I are in
complete agreement that there is a legitimate role for courts in
breaking the political stalemate that has brought us exclusionary
zoning, racial discrimination, and an unacceptable degree of social
distress in sheltering our people. But our different takes on the
Mount Laurel cases may explain why those cases have not sparked
a land-use revolution. Specifically, it is my view that Professor
Haar overvalues the importance of co-opting the private sector as a
key element in the success of the Mount Laurel process. I also be
lieve that he overstates the case for the legitimacy of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's intervention into land-use policymaking by
not inquiring closely enough into the precise nature of the constitu
tional violation at hand and the possibility of different paths to the
goal of land-use equity.
THE MOUNT LAUREL

STORY

In all likelihood, the reader whose attention has been drawn to
Suburbs Under Siege is already familiar with the New Jersey
ized in principle by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In January 1986, I argued (unsuccess·
fully) the Urban League portion of the so-called Mount Laurel Ill case, described infra note
13 and accompanying text, before the supreme court, and in 1993 I represented the New
Jersey affiliate of the ACLU amicus curiae in the Warren Township case, described infra text
accompanying note 53. I was during this same period a founding member and President of
the Alliance for Affordable Housing, a coalition of public-interest groups that successfully
coordinated opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment that would (as its propo
nents urged on their bumper stickers) "Undo Mount Laurel 1\vo." The Alliance also con·
ducted the first major study of Mount Laurel compliance, see infra note 21. At present, I am
representing a statewide advocacy organization, New Jersey Future, in as yet unpublished
litigation against the Council on Affordable Housing that challenges approval of an inclu
sionary development on the basis that it violates the "sound planning" language in the sec·
ond Mount Laurel case, see 456 A.2d at 430-31.
3. It has been expressly followed, and then only in a limited way, in New Hampshire. See
Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991).
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Supreme Court's bold experiment in law reform, the Mount Laurel
doctrine, and it is not my intention to retell the story here under the
guise of reviewing the book. Nor, in all frankness; would I send the
reader to Professor Haar's account solely for the purpose of acquir
ing the narrative details of the events in question; while his telling
of the tale is serviceable, his real interest in telling it - and mine in
his telling - is so that he can then use the story as a case study in
judicial activism.4

The Mount Laurel Litigation
skeletal summary suffice, then. In 1971,5

Let this
a team of
young legal services lawyers in Camden, New Jersey came to the aid
of black residents of Mount Laurel Township, a once-rural commu
nity that was rapidly developing as a bedroom suburb of
Philadelphia. Their goal was to break the municipality's exclusion
ary land use system, which consisted of zoning laws and habitability
codes operating in tandem to force demolition of the poor, run
down housing that was all the plaintiffs could afford - a chicken
coop in one notorious example - and to preclude the construction
of modest new homes and subsidized public housing that could
have given them safe, sanitary, and affordable alternatives. When
the case reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, it was welcomed
by Justice Frederick Hall, who had been campaigning within the
court for years to reform its excessive. deference to municipal au
tonomy in land-use matters.6 Justice Hall's opinion gave voice to
what is now known as the Mount Laurel doctrine:

We conclude that every such [developing] municipality must, by its
land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an ap
propriate variety and choice of housing. . . . at least to the extent of
the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional
need therefor.7
4. For an exhilarating recounting of the Mount Laurel story that fills in the bare outlines I
have sketched here, the reader will want to seek out DAVID L. Kiru> ET AL., OuR ToWN:
RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995).
5. Professor Haar erroneously dates the original lawsuit to 1974. Pp. 1, 17. The papers
were actually filed in May 1971; the trial court opinion was issued on May 1, 1972, see South
ern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 290 A.2d 465 {N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1972), and the Supreme Court opinion on March 24, 1975, see Mt. Laurel I, 336
A.2d 713.
6. Justice Hall's dissent in Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 181 A.2d 129, 140, 145 (N.J.
1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), is commonly regarded as .the opening judicial salvo in the cam
paign that eventually resulted in the Mount Laurel doctrine.
7. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724. The "regional fair share" obligation of Mount Laurel
I was originally interpreted to apply only to "developing" municipalities such as Mount Lau
rel Township. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 422-23. This interpretation was modified in
Mount Laurel II to apply to all municipalities throughout the state, insofar as they had "in
digenous" housing need. Municipalities that encompassed land that was identified on state
plans as appropriate for "growth" had further "fair share" obligations beyond their indige
nous need. See 456 A.2d at 430.
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This first Mount Laurel opinion prompted furious political opposi
tion, municipal intransigence, and a flood of lawsuits, but very little
actual progress toward breaking the back, of exclusionary zoning.
Then, in 1983, under the vigorous leadership of new chief justice
Robert Wilentz, the court issued a second major decision, Mount
Laurel II,8 in which it reaffirmed the holding of the first Mount
Laurel case and outlined a sweeping set of remedial steps designed
to ensure that municipalities obeyed their obligations under the
New Jersey Constitution. Three specially assigned trial judges were
given responsibility for all Mount Laurel-related litigation through
out the state. They were told to develop a formula that would as
sign specific numerical "fair share" obligations to individual
municipalities, and they were authorized to grant "builder's reme
dies" to plaintiffs who successfully demonstrated that a municipal
ity's land use ordinances were exclusionary. Pursuant to a
"builder's remedy," the successful developer-litigant could bypass
the local zoning and win a court order permitting its project to be
built, so long as the builder proposed an "inclusionary develop
ment" - that is, one in which at least twenty percent of the units
were made affordable to low- and moderate-income households.9
The Legislative Response
When the Mount Laurel trial judges began implementing their
Mount Laurel II powers vigorously in 1984 and 1985, the legislature
finally responded, as the court had been urging it to do since 1975.
It enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1985,10 arguably the most pro
gressive piece of state housing legislation anywhere in the country.
The Act's centerpiece was a new agency, the Council on Affordable
Housing (COAH), which was authorized to take over from the
courts the task of calculating housing obligations and certifying
compliance plans for any municipality that voluntarily submitted to
the Council's jurisdiction. The bait for doing so was that "substan
tively certified" municipalities were effectively immunized from
Mount Laurel litigation.11 The Act also authorized municipalities
to transfer up to fifty percent of their fair share obligations to other
municipalities pursuant to so-called Regional Contribution Agree
ments (RCAs), so long as the "sending" municipality also :financed
the housing activity in the "receiving" municipality.12 In practice,
8. 456 A.2d at 390. Justice Hall, the author of Mount Laurel I, retired from the court
shortly after that decision was announced and had died by the time Mount Laurel II was
decided.
9. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 452. On inclusionary zoning generally, see ALAN
MALLA.CH, lNCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES {1984),
10. N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
11. See N.J. STAT. ANN § 52:27D-322.
12. See N.J. STAT. ANN § 52:27D-312.
.

.

.
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this permitted a reallocation of fair share housing obligations and the low-income housing itself - from all-White middle-class
suburbs to·poorer and non-White urban centers.

In 1986, in Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 13 the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act,
even while acknowledging that in some respects it diluted the meth
ods of compliance that had been developed judicially. Since then,
the supreme court has largely withdrawn from the field. It has
tinkered at the edges, generally in ways that are helpful to the pro
ponents of housing equity,14 but has not revisited first principles, as
it did in Mount Laurel IL The process remains controversial, but
not at the white-heat level of a decade ago - when the governor
could score political points by denouncing Mount Laurel II as
"communistic."15 The Council on Affordable Housing has bent
over backward to accommodate municipal interests and concerns,
and while housing advocates have decried the slow pace of pro
gress, they have lacked the political power to control the process to
the extent that they did in the courts.
·

In recounting all of this, Suburbs Under Siege takes an under
stated approach, but Professor Haar leaves no doubt about his ad
miration for the Mount Laurel doctrine and the judges that
produced it. He has a deft way of capturing points of the story in a
phrase that is just right; he describes the odious RCAs, for example,
as a "safety valve" (p. 114), the kind of messy compromise that poli
ticians regularly craft and that judges must learn to accept if they
are to infiltrate the politician's turf in law reform cases. His charac
terization of the internal division between "the infantry of the trial
courts and the strategic headquarters of the supreme court" (p. 32)
puts into clear perspective a problem that bedeviled administration
of the first Mount Laurel opinion. Cases under the Mount Laurel
doctrine prior to 1983 were so numerous, so complex, and so never13. 510 A.2d 621 {NJ. 1986). Hills is often erroneously referred to as Mount Laurel Ill,
though Mount Laurel township was then no longer a party to any exclusionary zoning
litigation.
14. In addition to the two major cases discussed later in the text, Holmdel Builders Assn.
v. Township of Holmdel, 583 A2d 277 (NJ. 1990) (upholding municipal authority to levy
development impact fees to support Mount Laurel compliance) and In re Warren Township,
622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993) (limiting residency preferences in compliance plans), see, e.g.,
Prowitz v. Ridgefield Park Village, 584 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1991) (Mount Laurel units to be as
sessed for property tax purposes at controlled, rather than market, price). For a less helpful,
although arguably correct, decision, see Alexander's Department Stores, Inc. v. Borough of
Paramus, 592 A.2d 1168 (N.J. 1991) (COAH does not have ancillary jurisdiction to resolve
conventional zoning disputes that derive from a municipality's certified fair share plan).
15. See K:!RP ET AL., supra note 4, at 121. The authors attribute the quote to an interview
in the New York Times but do not provide a citation. For one version of the remark, see
Robert Hanley, Some Jersey Towns, Giving in to Courts, Let in Modest Homes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 29, 1984, at Al, reporting that Governor Kean, in an interview, described forced eco
nomic mixing as "a 'communist' concept."
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ending that the lower courts at times all but subverted Justice Hall's
mandate in order to make them go away. This explains why the
second Mount Laurel decision concentrated all implementing
power in three specially assigned trial judges, who would have pri
mary loyalty to the Mount Laurel opinion and the process it man
dated, without any other docket pressures. He also points out, with
just the right touch of irony, that a success of the Mount Laurel
doctrine was to force the breakdown of stereotypes about poverty
and race in the sensitive area of land use, where an instinctive de
fense of home can blind otherwise fair-minded people to the cal
lousness of their attitudes: "Whenever a town absorbs new low
and moderate-income housing and the sky does not come tumbling
down, other communities will be that much more likely to take the
leap themselves" (p. 191).
Understanding the Mount Laurel Story
But I do not mean to suggest that the success of Suburbs Under
Siege is solely one of style, although the readable text and well
paced eloquence are certainly welcome. Professor Haar also offers
a number of thoughtful insights into the Mount Laurel process it
self. He notes, correctly, that Mount Laurel II does little to expli
cate the moral and ethical basis of the doctrine, a crucial judicial
mistake attributable, at least in part, to "hubris" on the part of the
chief justice (p. 48). He then continues with this summary passage,
which reveals the central problem of politics and judicial legitimacy:
With the wisdom born of the litigation that followed Mount Laurel II,
it is clear that the court should have focused more intensely on edu
cating the public. . . . Mount Laurel II appears unwilling to stoop to
the concerns and queries of the average citizen. Indeed, the most re
sounding chord in the opinion is not the court's desire to explain the
necessity for, or the limited or temporary nature of, the judicial inter
vention, but a determination to put steel into its Mount Laurel Doc
trine. [p. 50]

Other useful insights abound. Haar correctly notes that New
Jersey's Fair Housing Act and the ensuing COAH regulations codi
fied the core, although not always the details, of the Mount Laurel
doctrine (p. 71)
a view quite unlike the more conventional view
of the Act, and of the Hills decision sustaining the Act, as a
"sellout." He points out that there is a strong parallel between the
role of the court-appointed "expert" or master in Mount Laurel
cases and the conventional role of a planner in advising govern
ments as they make land-use decisions,16 although he does not pur
sue the implications of this by also pointing out that the more the
court's work looks like conventional planning activity, the more it
-

16. P. 79.; see also p. 82 (emphasizing the political skills of the masters).
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appears to the average citizen to be encroaching on political terrain.
Haar provides a good, balanced summary and critique of the Fair
Housing Act and the Hills decision, in which he largely avoids the
winners-losers trap17
if the municipalities won, then the good
-

guys must have lost. Haar also gets the Holmdel decision right,
pointing out that by essentially writing into the Act an authoriza
tion for development fees to subsidize lower-income housing that
nowhere appears explicitly in the legislative text, the decision con
tinues and reaffirms the court's pre-Fair Housing Act pattern of
making policy.18
·

Inevitably, I have a number of small- and medium-sized cavils
about Professor Haar's recounting of the Mount Laurel story, rriany
of which are explainable by the different vantage points he and I
have on the case. Eventually, it would be good to have a Mount
Laurel memoir written by one of the original legal team, but I do
not want to detract from Professor Haar's accomplishment by
nitpicking. Rather, I see his book as the start of a dialogue about
the courts and land-use policy, and to that end I turn to two major
themes, the public-private balance and the legitimacy issue, about
which I do have serious reservations.
PROFITING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

A recurring, and somewhat surprising, theme of Professor
Haar's book is that the court wisely entrusted the prosecution of
exclusionary zoning cases to private developer-plaintiffs, rather
than to public-interest groups. The 'central compliance t�chnique of
Mount Laurel II, the builder's remedy, provided a huge profit in
centive for private developers. Equally important, the ·case not only
shifted the initiative in Mount Laurel litigation from public-interest
plaintiffs to the private sector, it also dramatically reduced the risk
of litigation. The court simplified and objectified the Mount Laurel
rules so much that, in the infamous comment of one developer's
attorney, defeating a municip�ty "is as simple as clubbing baby
17. Pp. 96-98. He does miss a subtle, but key, point, however. To the extent that there
were clear winners and losers in Hills, the losers were those builders and public-interest
plaintiffs who were unable to prevent courts from transferring their cases to the newly cre
ated Council on Affordable Housing, so as to avoid a long hiatus while the COAH drafted its
substantive rules. This delay was not mandated by the Act, which permitted the courts to
retain cases where there would be a "manifest injustice" in transferring them, see N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 52:27D-316[a], a standard that easily could have been met by cases that had been in
litigation for a decade or more and were, in some instances, literally within days of final
judicial resolution. See Hills, 510 A.2d at 635 (noting that the final Cranbury Township hear
ing was scheduled for December 2, 1985, 35 days before oral argument in Hills). By the time
the transferred cases began emerging from COAH in 1988 and 1989, the huge building boom
of the 1980s was deflating rapidly, and a great deal of affordable housing that could have
been built in inclusionary developments was lost or seriously delayed.
18. P. 120 (analyzing Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990)).

·
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seals."19 Prior to Mount Laurel II, there had been a mixture of
public and private plaintiffs; the actual Mount Laurel case had no
private developers participating as parties until after the decision in
Mount Laurel I in 1975. Between 1983 and 1986, more than a hun
dred private developer suits were filed against some seventy munic
ipalities, and no new public interest suits were filed.20

The "Builder's Remedy"
Commentators have generally applauded the court's endorse
ment of the builder's remedy, and with some justification; co-opting
the private housing market in an era of declining public subsidies
for low-_ and moderate-income housing produced results in the early
years after Mount Laurel II that would have been otherwise unob
tainable.21 But Professor Haar warns us that these results came at a
price - "the builder's remedy narrowed the scope of latent solu
tions, and once unleashed, it was potentially powerful enough to
distort the impact of the Mount Laurel Doctrine" (p. 45). He is
certainly right about that. As I have explained elsewhere, the abil
ity to provide land to build "inclusionary developments" in satisfac
tion of the builder's remedy became the be-all and end-all of the
compliance process, so much so that inclusionary zoning is now
welded permanently into the fair share rules of the Council on Af
fordable Housing.22 Through a "vacant land adjustment"23 and a
fair-share calculation based on the concept of the "reasonable de
velopment potential"24 of the municipality, the COAR rules essen
tially exclude Mount Laurel compliance where large, new
inclusionary developments are not feasible, such as in most of the
older, built-up parts of the state. This is certainly, in Professor
Haar's language, a "distortion" of the intent of Mount Laurel II (p.

45).
Haar also recognizes the broader implications of the reliance on
private sector builder-plaintiffs:

[I]t became clearer, as lawsuits accumulated, that the builders were in
there for their own profit, and that this was not an unalloyed good.
Adam Smith (or perhaps Hobbes) was proven right again. Most
builders were ready to make any kind of agreement with a municipal
ity - even where the outcome fed the exclusionary quality of the

19. The quotation in the text is a paraphrase. Not surprisingly for a remark so flamboy
ant, it can be found in KIRP ET AL., supra note 4, at 105, rather than Suburbs Under Siege.
20. See Alan Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban Exclusion: Zoning, Economics,
and the Future of the Berenson Doctrine, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 37, 119 (1986).
21. See Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey,
1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1197, 1210 (1989).
22. See statutes cited infra notes 23-24.
23. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 93-4.2 (1998).
24. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 93-4.2(e)-(g).

Mount Laurel

May 1998]

1693

zoning ordinance
as long as they obtained the zoning changes that
would enhance their own profit
. "I had less uneasiness about the
whole litigation process }Vhen a public interest group was the plaintiff,
rather than a builder. Therefore I felt less of a need for the court
appointed master in the public interest cases," explained one of the
Mount Laurel judges. [pp. 63-64]
-

.

.

.

Professor Haar quickly puts this trenchant criticism aside, how
ever. He describes the builder's remedy at one point as "the grand
strategy for achieving social reform without dependence on the
political actors within the executive and administrative branches
who might have resisted the Mount Laurel Doctrine or imple
mented it in a hostile spirit."25 Results count, in other words; the
end justifies the means. He was right in his initial skepticism, how
ever. There were other "latent solutions" to the problem of provid
ing lower-income housing in the suburbs, and he not only misses an
opportunity to explore why they remained "latent," he falls into
what I regard as the most serious error in his overall telling of the
Mount Laurel story. To understand why this is so, I need to drop
back for a moment and introduce a specific example.26

Private Remedies. in Action: Cranbury Township
Cranbury Township, which Haar mentions only in passing (p.

111), was a defendant in the Urban League litigation, one of the six
cases that composed Mount Laurel IL27 Cranbury Township

presented a picture far different from the Mount Laurel Township

25. P. 146; see'also p. 134 ("[T]he courts cleverly buttressed themselves by enlisting the
business sector").
26. I note here in passing that Suburbs Under Siege does not dig into the storytelling of
post-1983 events with the same thoroughness that it applies to telling the story of Mount
Laurel Township. By the time of the Hills decision in 1986, Mount Laurel Township had
settled its litigation and was no longer a significant player in the Mount Laurel story, and this
leaves the storytelling without a focus. As a result, Professor Haar's discussion of the conse
quences of Mount Laurel II through implementation, legislation, and finally administrative
procedures lacks the strong anchor in practical reality that informs the earlier part of the
book. Much more attention needs to be given to the day-to-day implementation of the doc
trine in the cases that became prominent after 1983. These cases can be told as stories, just as
the Mount Laurel Township story is told, so that they are not known only from the slender
evidence of the published judicial decisions. The lack of a strong, specific storytelling focus
may be what leads Professor Haar astray in his enthusiasm for the market solution to the
Mount Laurel problem, as I shall try to show by telling a bit more of the post-1983 Mount
Laurel story.
27. Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret, 359 A.2d 526 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976), revd., 406 A.2d 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), modified,
336 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1975). The narrative that follows in the text is based on my personal
experiences during the Urban League litigation. I became co-counsel to the Urban League of
Greater New Brunswick - it later changed its name to the Civic League of Greater New
Brunswick - at the time of the remand and participated extensively in the subsequent pro
ceedings. Documentation is available in the author's voluminous but unpublished litigation
files in the case, which are available at Rutgers Law School for inspection by interested
readers.
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of 1970. Although Cranbury's land-use ordinances were hopelessly
exclusionary - at least as Justice Hall would have understood the
term - the town had better reasons to regret growth than did
Mount Laurel. A small farming village surrounded by actively
worked fields, its Main Street and adjacent residential district, dat
ing from the tum of the nineteenth century, were listed on the Na
tional Register of Historic Places. "Preserving" Cranbury was an
instantly marketable idea, the value of which could be understood
readily by the average citizen of goodwill. Unfortunately for
Cranbury, however, holding back time was not really an option: it
was served by an adjacent exit on the New Jersey Turnpike, it was
five miles or so due east of the burgeoning Route One Corridor
area of office and research parks centered on Princeton University,
and its elegant older homes made it a favorite for upper-level bu
reaucrats and private-sector lobbyists working in Trenton, the state
capital, just a few miles to the south. Nor did Cranbury Township
totally resist change, so long as it was in the form of tax-paying
commercial development or upscale, large-lot subdivisions.
Cranbury was, in short, an exclusionary community whose land-use
ordinances stood in violation of the New Jersey Constitution, but in
remedying that wrong there was a significant risk that the courts
would do more harm than good by creating yet another example of
a nice community ruined by sprawl development.
Prior to the decision in Mount Laurel II, Cranbury Township
was in litigation on two fronts, against the Urban League plaintiffs
- a public-interest group acting directly on behalf of lower-income
people - and against a private builder's-remedy plaintiff whose
principals included Carl Bisgaier, the lawyer who had brought the
original Mount Laurel suit in 1970. Bisgaier and his colleagues,
who remained committed to the social goals of the Mount Laurel
doctrine, �ere out to prove that those goals could be combined with
profitmaking in what might be seen as a form of socially responsible
capitalism. Cranbury fought both plaintiffs fiercely.
After Mount Laurel II, however, it did not require rocket sci
ence to realize the profit potential of a builder's remedy. Cranbury,
with its historic district, sylvan fields, and access to high-end em
ployment, became a magnet for Mount Laurel lawsuits. Within a
few months of the Mount Laurel II decision, eight additional devel
opers sued Cranbury, offering a total of more than three thousand
acres for development.28 Had all of this land been developed as
proposed, some 12,223 dwelling units would have been built at
gross densities ranging from 4.8 to 10 dwelling units per acre; of
28. See Cranbury Township Comm. & Planning Bd., Mount Laurel JI Compliance Pro
gram 1-2 (maps), tbl. 6 (Dec. 1984) (unpublished document on file with author) [hereinafter
Compliance Program].
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these, 2444 units would have been set aside for low- and moderate
income - that is, Mount Laurel - households,29 more than the
total number of Mount Laurel units that were eventually built state
wide in the five years after 1983.3° Cranbury, at the time of the
1980 Census, had a population of 1927 people and approximately
750 occupied dwelling units.31
The Urban League plaintiffs did not disagree that this amount
of development was much more than a small community could real
istically absorb over a short period of time, nor did they disagree
that this amount of development would present potentially serious
planning problems - including the destruction of valuable farm
land. Had the Urban League been in the lawsuit by itself, these
concerns would have been addressed with a view not only to build
ing affordable housing but to the larger public interest as well.
Each proffered site, and perhaps others, would have been examined
by the plaintiff's experts for compliance purposes. But because
none of the landowners or developers would have had a preemptive
builder's-remedy claim in this alternative scenario, any one site
could have been passed over had the Urban League and Cranbury
chosen to do so in proposing a settlement to the court. Indeed, the
Urban League would have been free 'to· discuss with the township
alternate ways of encouraging low- and moderate-income housing
that did not involve inclusionary zoning at all.
This is exactly what happened in the neighboring township,
Plainsboro, where for idiosyncratic reasons, the Urban League liti
gated by itself, without a single builder's-remedy claimant.32 Plains
boro informed the Urban League that it would settle quickly to
reduce litigation costs, so long as it could settle without a major
infusion of new inclusionary developments. The town had grown
rapidly from an agricultural village to a sprawl of garden apart
ments during the 1970s, and it had learned its planning lesson, even
if a bit belatedly. An innovative settlement was concluded in due
course that involved only 200 units in an inclusionary development
- forty of which were for Mount Laurel households. The remain
der of Plainsboro's fair share was to be met partly in a subsidized
development consisting of 413 Mount Laurel rental units with no
market rate units, and partly by taking development fees from new
commercial developments in the Route One corridor and applying
the money to buy down the cost of 120 rental units already in place
29.

Id.

30.

See Lamar et al., supra

31.

Compliance Program, supra

at tbl.6, col. 7.
note 21, at 1210.
note 28, at 4.

32. As with Cranbury, the Plainsboro narrative is drawn from my personal experience
during the litigation and is documented in litigation files as explained supra note 27.
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from the earlier phases of Plainsboro's growth - a kind of home
grown housing voucher program.33
In Cranbury, however, the builder-plaintiff sites drove out all
strategies other than inclusionary zoning. No one could stop the
builder plaintiffs from suing, and once they did, the supreme court
had decreed, in effect, that at least one of them had valuable
"rights." Worse, the glut of would-be builder's-remedy claimants
made it impossible for the Urban League and any single builder
plaintiff to settle with the township, because the losers were virtu
ally guaranteed to challenge the settlement in court, eliminating any
time-and-money incentive to settle in the first place. The Urban
League had no choice but to sit by in frustration while the feeding
frenzy proceeded apace, knowing that the defendant municipality
was also sitting by, not in frustration, but in the enviable position of
being able to avoid serious talk about settling a case that it could
not win on the merits, hoping that the various plaintiffs would even
tually exhaust themselves. In the end, it was not exhaustion but
passage of time that mattered most, and Cranbury eventually did
emerge as the winner. Cranbury was still in the midst of the court
supervised remedial process - violation of the Mount Laurel doc
trine had already been determined by Judge Serpentelli - when
the Fair Housing Act and the Hills decision transferred the whole
mess to COAH.34 COAH reduced the township's fair share
number from 816 to 153, and most of the builder plaintiffs got noth
ing - including the Bisgaier group, which had borne the expense of
litigation for years and which sold its site for development of expen
sive single-family homes on large lots when it became clear that it
could not prevail with its inclusionary plan.35
33. See Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret, Consent Order Re:
Plainsboro Township, No. C-4122-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 22, 1985). This settle
ment later collapsed because the key subsidy for the 100% Mount Laurel development, tax
sheltered depreciation write-offs, was eliminated by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
See Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing
Credit, 38 V1LL. L. REv. 871, 883 nn.62-64 (1993). But the principle behind the settlement
remains sound: without a clutter of builder plaintiffs, a broader range of strategies can be
considered seriously. The Plainsboro settlement could be roughly replicated today using the
Low Income Housing Tax Credits that Congress eventually provided to replace the tradi
tional tax-sheltering schemes. See id.
34. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 635 (N.J. 1986).
35. COAH eventually certified Cranbury's Mount Laurel compliance plan in 1987. See
COAH, Mediation Report-Cranbury Township/Middlesex County, Audrey M. Winkler, Me
diator, Aug. 24, 1987. The plan included an RCA transfer of 76 units to Perth Amboy, New
Jersey, an old and poor port town at the mouth of the Raritan River; rehabilitation of 10
units of substandard existing housing; and two developments totaling 58 units. One was a
senior citizen development, 100% low and moderate units, tucked in behind the historic
Main Street shops and houses, adjacent to the public school and athletic field, and barely
encroaching on the farm fields that stretched west from the village. The other was an inclu
sionary development of large, single-family homes on large lots, also sited as an extension of
the existing village, and in this instance moving toward the highways that had already obliter
ated the rural character of the village in that direction. Most significant, the inclusionary -
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The Urban League plaintiffs did try at one point to unclog the
Cranbury litigation by supporting the township in a motion to strike
the largest builder's remedy claimant on the ground that the devel
oper, Lawrence Zirinsky, had used Mount Laurel as a "threat" to
obtain other favorable, non-Mount Laurel development approvals
before intervening as a Mount Laurel plaintiff. Professor Haar
speaks favorably of the "threat" language in Mount Laurel II as a
"further hedge[ ] about a remedy so powerful" (p. 45), but he does
not connect it to the Cranbury experience. If he had, he might not
have been so approving. To the astonishment of the other builder
plaintiffs, who thought that a public-interest party would, by defini
tion, support them uncritically since they were offering to build
lower-income housing, the Urban League argued that the court
should define the "threat" exception to eliminate plaintiffs who did
not come to the court "clean" - that is, whose first offer to the
town was not for Mount Laurel housing. Unless the court adopted
such a rule, the Urban League argued, the exact kind of tangle that
was strangling the Cranbury litigation would result. Judge
Serpentelli, perhaps understanding the supreme court's preference
for private litigants better than the Urban League did, denied the
motion. The "hedge," in other words, was flimsy and has not, so far
as I am aware, had any significant use in the years since Mount
Laurel IL
The Limits of Privatization
As for Professor Haar, there is no guessing about his admiration
for the use of private litigants as the primary moving force in the
Mount Laurel story, and this is the least successful theme of Sub
urbs Under Siege. Although Haar makes a gesture toward the
public-interest bar by describing the "unusual combination of ener
gies" that resulted when both public and private parties were bring
ing cases, he proceeds immediately to praise "[t]he rare coincidence
of private- and public-sector interests [that] testifies to the ingenu
ity of Mount Laurel II in harnessing the expertise and profit drive
of the private sector - the developer - in order to achieve a pub
lic end" (p. 63). It is the private sector, in other words, that he sees
as essential to making the Mount'Laurel doctrine a success. Nor is
it simply that he sees the private sector as a useful addition to the
mix; he appears to be deeply skeptical about the capacity of the
public-interest bar to sustain this type of litigation. Thus, in a pasMount Laurel
units in this latter project are four-family units fitted into structures that
have the scale and massing of the adjacent single-family homes, so that they do not appear
incongruous in context. Except for the RCA and the smaller fair share, Cranbury's compli
ance plan easily could have been accepted by the Urban League plaintiffs in 1984. But the
ha=erlock of the builder's remedy made that kind of negotiation impossible.
-
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sage soon after the words quoted above, he criticizes public-interest
plaintiffs for delaying compliance in one unnamed case for six years
because "they were not . . . equipped to monitor the development
process" (p. 64). He is certainly correct that compliance dragged on
for years in many cases, but it did so for a variety of reasons including municipal creativity in finding ways to slow the process and these problems were not confined to the public interest cases.36
Moreover, as the Cranbury experience demonstrates, the "unusual
combination of energies" that Professor Haar applauds at least
nominally - the mix of public-interest and developer plaintiffs has at least as much potential for slowing down the process as it
does for benefiting from the enforcement capacity of the private
sector.
Professor Haar's enthusiasm for private remedies leads him to
several debatable conclusions. He is much too generous, for exam
ple, in appraising the work of COAR. I doubt that there is any
public-interest housing advocate in the state of New Jersey who
would agree with him that COAR has adopted an "aggressive pos
ture in pursuing the Mount Laurel doctrine" (p. 104). As Professor
Haar recognizes and describes accurately elsewhere in his book (pp.
92-93), the Fair Housing Act was adopted only grudgingly by a leg
islature in a political bind: home rule notwithstanding, it had to do
something to get the courts off the back of outraged municipalities.
COAR was set up to dissipate constitutional pressure, not to fur
ther expand constitutional confrontation by pursuing aggressive
new policies. As I have explained, however,37 COAR incorporated
into its rules a single-minded focus on measuring compliance
through large-scale inclusionary developments constructed by pri
vate developers, and this is apparently what Professor Haar sees as
COAR's "aggressive" 'stance. Maybe so, but only to the extent that
the public's interest in affordable housing coincides with the private
interest of large-scale developers. Suburbs Under Siege does not do
36. For one example, see Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret,
Restraining Order re: Old Bridge Township, No.C-41 2 2-73 (N.J. May 31, 1985 ) (Serpentelli,
J.). The builder was Oakwood at Madison, which had won the first builder's remedy that the
New Jersey Supreme Court approved, see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 371 A.2d 119 2 {NJ. 1977 ). The development could not be built in the housing
recession of the late 1970s, and the Urban League, investigating the status of the township's
compliance in 1984 after Mount Laurel II, found that the township, whose name had since
been changed to Old Bridge, already had approved a market rate "phase" of the Oakwood
development, without making any provision for the required Mount Laurel units. Because
the normal rule in Mount Laurel development is that the lower-income units must be phased
with the market units, to prevent the developer from walking away at the end with the subsi
dized units unbuilt, the Urban League had little difficulty persuading Judge Serpentelli that
stem measures were in order. But the episode demonstrates that in proving "Adam Smith
(or perhaps Hobbes ) ...right again," as Professor Haar puts it {p.63 ), there is no obvious
reason to prefer private to public litigants in Mount Laurel cases.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 23- 24.
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much to identify, let along explicate, the inherent tension between
these two interests.
Later, in commenting_ on the court's willingness to uphold the
Fair Housing Act, which undercuts some of the remedies developed
by the Mount Laurel judges, Professor Haar offers the astonishing
comment that "[h]ad there been more visible support from public
interest groups, the court might have struggled harder [in Hills] to
make the actions of the three trial judges more broadly applicable
and to elaborate still further the principles of its doctrine" (p. 98).
What Professor Haar overlooks is that by embracing the builder's
remedy, the private-sector remedy, so wholeheartedly, the court, in
effect, drove the public-interest bar out of the Mount Laurel area.
Although public-interest litigation often depends heavily on the un
paid labors of volunteer attorneys, planning experts, and others, it
still is not free; the Urban League litigation was supported by a
substantial grant from a New Jersey foundation to pay for deposi
tions, travel expenses of witnesses, and so forth. F urthermore,
volunteerism has its limits. To be done well, public-interest litiga
tion requires paid counsel that can devote adequate time to the
case, just as any private-interest litigant would prefer. Thus, it re
mains a total mystery to me why the supreme court was so willing
to award private-sector Mount Laurel litigants a substantial finan
cial "bonus" in the form of a builder's remedy, while at the same
time explicitly denying civil rights attorney's fees to public-interest
plaintiffs.38
The baneful results of this tilt toward privatization include some
of those that Professor Haar himself notes, but which he ultimately
seems willing to disregard in his admiration for the court's genius in
co-opting the private sector. Criticizing the standard 4:1 ratio of
market rate to Mount Laurel units as too rigid, he observes that
"[a]s time passed, it became clear that the court's formula had not
squeezed the developers hard enough" (p. 166). But if the builders
are the only parties before the courts, who is to do the squeezing?
Certainly not the builders, whose profit margins are at stake. Haar
points out that the emphasis on the builder's remedy shrinks the
range of possible solutions, which in tum exacerbates the public
relations problem that he criticizes the court for not dealing with
effectively. Because the builder's remedy gobbles up land - four
units of market-rate housing to build each Mount Laurel unit inclusionary zoning is a fat target for anyone who is concerned
about overdevelopment and sprawl. This in tum provides a conve38. The New Jersey Rules of Court, NJ. R.Cr.4:42-9, lists all of those cases in which fees
are recoverable, without including Mount Laurel. The unavailability of state fees is implicit
in Urban League v. Mayor of the Borough of Carteret, 559 A.2d 1369 (NJ. 1989 ) (denying a
fee claim under federal attorney's fee law ).
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nient cover for those whose exclusionary motives are less admira
ble. As Haar correctly notes, the Mount Laurel process "may be
faulted for failing to stress rental housing" (p. 166). This is of criti
cal importance to low-income families, because they often lack the
cash reserves and credit history to qualify for even a subsidized
home purchase. But this dearth of rental housing results not be
cause, as Professor Haar suggests, the trial judges and masters
failed to require it; it results because the private sector did not want
to build it and would not participate - even for the reward of a
builder's remedy
if rental was a condition.39
Moreover, reliance on the private sector causes some of the dis
interest among public-interest groups that Professor Haar decries.
It is true that many of those whose advocacy is on behalf of the
seriously poor have lost interest in the Mount Laurel process, but
the overemphasis on the builder's remedy bears a significant share
of the blame. The typical builder's willingness to subsidize Mount
Laurel units ceases at about the point where a household earns less
than forty percent of the regional median income. Even though
techniques are available to adjust the mix in an inclusionary devel
opment so that families below this income level can be made eligi
ble, most developers simply balk. So Mount Laurel is left open to
the criticism that it does not serve the interests of the "poorest of
the poor," those whose plight makes the most appealing case for
changing public policy. The criticism is at least in part justified, but
Professor Haar misses an opportunity to explain how the court
missed an opportunity to make things better by thinking harder
about the role of public-interest agencies in the process.
-

A Role for Public-Interest Plaintiffs
The supreme court got it exactly backward, I would argue, and
in applauding the court's approach, so does Professor Haar. Be
cause "Adam Smith (or Hobbes)" is alive and well in the spirit of
the business community, the court should have recognized that the
natural seat of public-interest law reform is in the public-interest
community (p. 63). The court should have taken steps to bolster
the ability of civil rights organizations, legal services offices, and
other civic groups to investigate, sue, and then monitor compliance
with Mount Laurel orders, through the simple device of civil rights
attorney's fees on the model of federal law.40 In the extreme, one
could argue that the builder's remedy, the most celebrated feature
39. Note, for example, that in the Urban League settlement with Plainsboro Township,
supra note 33, the public-interest plaintiffs bargained for 413 of 453 new construction units to
be rental rather than sales units, by relying on not-for-profit and public sponsorship and
avoiding private market developers.
40. See 4 2 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 ).
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of the Mount Laurel doctrine, was unnecessary. All the court
needed to do was to endorse the concept of inclusionary zoning.
Public-interest plaintiffs then would have looked for appropriate in
clusionary sites and cooperated with willing developers, retaining,
along with the courts, some greater measure of discretion to avoid
having to approve a development just because a builder had a
"remedy."
But a court did not need to go as far as to take this extreme
position. Public-interest and builder's-remedy claims could both
have been allowed, had the court recognized that the builder's rem
edy - the inducement to sue - was unnecessary when there was
already a competent public-interest litigant handling the case. In
Cranbury, for example, the Urban League plaintiffs had been in the
litigation for years; it was ludicrous even to consider rewarding the
late-coming builders as if they were the ones responsible for prov
ing Cranbury's ordinance unconstitutional.41 Had it retained con
trol of the litigation, the Urban League would have considered the
various builder sites and proposed the best ones to the town for
settlement, and Cranbury likely would have had affordable housing
in the ground years earlier than actually occurred.

That the model I am describing would have worked is not just
speculation - it did work. Piscataway Township, another township
included in the Urban League suit, had experienced rapid growth
because of a new interstate highway across its northern edge, and it
was therefore suitable for inclusionary zoning solutions. Initially,
however, no builder's-remedy plaintiffs were involved in the case
because Piscataway, unlike Cranbury, was open to development.
Developers did not need the Hobbesian Mount Laurel wedge to
gain access to the community. Instead, the public-interest plaintiffs
spent an agonizing period of discovery, poring over township tax
maps with their planning expert, and eventually taking three full
days of deposition testimony from the township's planner, to iden
tify and evaluate every significant piece of vacant, developable land
for possible inclusion in the court-ordered compliance plan. Only
then did inclusionary developers begin to pay attention, but on the
. public-interest plaintiffs' terms - which included genuine concern
for sound planning solutions.42

41. Judge Serpentelli did deny some would-be builder's-remedy plaintiffs the right to in
tervene, but on the kind of old-fashioned civil procedure ground that Professor Haar decries
elsewhere, see p.137, namely, that the intervention came on the eve of trial and would dis
rupt the discovery schedule.
4 2. See Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Carteret, Letter-Opinion, No. C41 2 2-73, July 23, 1985 (unpublished); Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and
Council of Borough of Carteret, Judgment as to Piscatawy, No.C-41 2 2-73, Sept.17, 1985. It
is also interesting to note in this regard that the largest inclusionary developer in New Jersey,
the K. Hovnanian Company of Red Bank, has seldom if ever, so far as I am aware, been a
builder's-remedy plaintiff in a Mount Laurel case. Rather than assuming an adversarial role
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If I am critical of Professor Haar's analysis of "public interest"
and "market" solutions to the Mount Laurel problem, and I am, it
also bears stating that his is the prevailing wisdom and mine the
dissenting view. I have dwelt on it here at some length in part be
cause Professor Haar's lifelong commitment to sound planning val
ues, which ought to have made him skeptical of the builder's
remedy, apparently was not enough to overcome the siren song of
the quick and tangible results that could be obtained from the
court's potentially Faustian bargain with the developers. This tells
me that revising the conventional wisdom will not be easy. My con
cerns also relate directly to the "legitimacy" and "public relations"
themes of his book, to which I now turn, because in my view the
popular stereotype of the builder's remedy and, on occasion, the
tangible evidence of its misuse - suburban sprawl development have been a very large factor in the inability of the courts and the
public interest community to sell the Mount Laurel doctrine as a
legitimate exercise of public policy.
ACTIVIST CouRTs:

THE MooNT LA OREL PROCESS

Suburbs Under Siege hits its stride at about the midpoint, where
Professor Haar shifts his focus from narrative to critique; the heart
of his thesis is found in Chapters Ten and Eleven, entitled, respec
tively, "Leadership in Institutional Reform: Rallying Support for a
Vision," and "The Last Recourse: Why Judges Intervene." The
two chapters should be considered in reverse order, however. The
"Leadership" chapter, which is very brief, criticizes the New Jersey
Supreme Court for not "selling" its Mount Laurel decisions effec
tively to the public. But selling the c;iecisions assumes that the jus
tices had a legitimate basis for rendering them in the first place, and
so "Why Judges Intervene" is really the first and more important
question.
A Theory of Judicial Activism
Professor Haar's answer is succinct:
The Mount Laurel litigations bring to the fore the residual role of
the courts in the checks-and-balances system of a constitutional de
mocracy. Local governments, ordinarily endowed with total discre
tion in the exercise of zoning power, are found to be seriously and
chronically � constitutional default. In such a state of affairs,
and engendering the animosity of the township - on whose goodwill the developer inevita
bly depends for numerous small matters during the course of development - Hovnanian
typically came in after a Mount Laurel suit was finished, acquired the compliance site, and
thereafter built what is generally regarded to be a very acceptable affordable housing prod
uct. Achieving Mount Laurel goals, in other words, is not dependent so much on the
builder's remedy as it is on inclusionary zoning, which public-interest plaintiffs are quite ca
pable of negotiating.
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whatever a court's adherence to the separation of powers as usually
enunciated or whatever the loyalty to the conventional division of
powers among the levels of government as typically argued, the strict
rules of judicial insulation become inapposite. [p. 175]
The "usual," "conventional," or "typical" rules of separation of
powers can be set aside, he argues, because it is both "appropriate"
and "necessary" to vest in the courts "a residual role" (pp. 175-82).
It is appropriate for four reasons: because a constitutional right is
at stake (p. 176); because the courts are institutionally disinterested
other than in the correct application of the rules of law (p. 176);
because courts, unlike legislatures, are capable of acting as trustees
for future generations against the "long-term, potentially irrevers
ible, and frequently incalculable harms" of present-day political
decisionmaking (p. 177); and because it is a peculiar characteristic
of the judicial system that it can stimulate "reasoned discourse"
about "a more generous vision of the social order" than can the
political process (p. 177). It is necessary, in the Mount Laurel cases,
because there is no reason to believe that the political system will
correct the violation of the constitutional order on its own and be
cause the decentralization of political power in state and local gov
ernments makes it impossible to bring a regional perspective to
land use issues (p. 181).
Some of this framework is essentially unarguable. The dynamic
of modem-day politics certainly places a premium on short-term
fixes that can pay off before the next election rather than on long
term solutions - particularly if they carry short term costs - and
land-use decisionmaking is extremely fragmented because of the
tradition of deference to local control in this field. Beyond these
basic points, however, agreement fades. Even if we can readily ac
cept that judges are more likely to keep an eye on the interests of
future generations, the future remains essentially unknowable, even
to conscientious judges. Thus, it may not be obvious to the present
generation that � judicial decision is legitimate simply because it is
forward-looking. Nor, in connection with political fragmentation
and the abuses of local control, is it correct to identify the state
courts as the only institution with a sufficiently broad perspective to
correct any perceived abuses. The governor and the state legisla
ture have a statewide perspective, even if imperfect. To many peo
ple, these political institutions' acceptance of a decentralized land
use process reflects the legitimate resolution of the pushes and pulls
of a myriad of interest groups. In the abstract, I would agree read
ily with Professor Haar that the enlightened New Jersey Supreme
Courts of Justice Hall and Chief Justice Wilentz had the capacity to
do a better job than the governors and legislatures of those times at
reforming the abuses of land-use power - witness Governor
Kean's "communistic" crack - but the "best" solution is not neces-
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sarily the only solution that can claim to be a legitimate one in a
complex world. On the factors thus far enumerated, Professor
Haar's claims for the legitimacy of structural reform litigation and
judicial decisionmaking have a slightly conclusory or makeweight
character about them.
Professor Haar's broader claims are also problematic. For ex
ample, one has to approach his assertion that courts are "disinter
ested" with caution. The disinterestedness of judges has been the
classic defense of the legitimacy of judicial review since the time of
John Marshall and Marbury v. Madison. 43 But as Professor Haar
himself carefully acknowledges, "pressed by the force of events,
even the court may become an advocate for a particular position or
side" (p. 176). His solution, imposing "curbs" on judges - "both
traditional and adjusted for the new situation" - that will "confine
too extensive an exercise of discretion" (p. 176; emphasis added),
will not do much to persuade the skeptical observer that judges are
truly "disinterested," at least without a much more thorough explo
ration of what may constitute "too extensive" an exercise of legiti
mate judicial power.

Finding the Constitutional Basis for Judicial Activism
The core of the problem with Professor Haar's justification for
an activist judiciary, at least as revealed through the example of the
Mount Laurel cases, lies in his first premise - namely, that there is
an unredressed constitutional violation that will remain un
redressed unless the court intervenes and acts for the benefit of the
victims of such behavior. In principle, he is certainly correct. Our
preference for legislative control in a democratic society notwith
standing, when the legislature disregards the constitution, as New
Jersey's did in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and Mount
Laurel II and even for some years thereafter, Professor Haar is
surely right to say that the legislature has forfeited much of its claim
to primacy. Judicial action becomes necessary - that is, legitimate
- to vindicate the higher mandate of the constitution itself (p.
177). So, too, it is easier to accept a judge's slipping from disinter
estedness to advocacy, for present as well as future generations,
when such one-sidedness is on behalf of an accepted constitutional
principle. Holmes and Brandeis were not disinterested when it
came to the First Amendment, but their views are now accepted as
legitimate nonetheless.
But is there an accepted constitutional principle that undergirds
the vigorous and controversial activism of the Mount Laurel cases?
The simple answer, and the one that apparently convinces Professor
43. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch ) 137 (1803).
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Haar that he need go no farther, is that in Mount Laurel I the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that there was a constitutional principle
that had been violated - the principle of regional "fair share" that
Justice Hall found to be embodied in the constitutional concept of
"general welfare." As a constitutional lawyer, I have no quarrel
with the New Jersey Supreme Court's analytic use of the general
welfare approach, but in accepting it as the basis for explaining the
legitimacy of the court's activist stance in political terms to the lay
public, Professor Haar inevitably commits himself to an argument
that is, again, a bit circular. The New Jersey Constitution does not
contain the phrase "fair share," and the phrase "general welfare" is,
well, general. It can mean many things to many people, and one can
certainly perceive how the average person in the street - particu
larly if that person is faced with an unpopular order to rezone in his
or her backyard for development that he or she does not welcome
- might think that the court interpreted the constitution the way it
did in order to be able to pursue, as the modem-day conservative
would have it, its liberal agenda.44
This problem of the relationship between judicial legitimacy and
the general welfare theory has dogged the Mount Laurel process
from the outset. I wrote about it in 1976;45 less friendly critics have
heaped scorn on the theory.46 I regret that Professor Haar did not
tum his formidable experience and analytic skills more fully to the
problem. In saying this, I hope that I am not falling into the cus
tomary book-review mode of complaining that the author should
have written the book that I think he should have written. Without
a more probing inquiry into the condition precedent of a popularly
acceptable constitutional theory crying out for enforcement, Profes
sor Haar's very valuable analysis of the conditions subsequent that
justify judicial activism simply does not persuade those who, unlike
me, are not already persuaded.
The uncompleted task of Professor Haar's analysis, therefore, is
to inquire whether a reformulation of the underlying constitutional
obligation that animates the Mount Laurel doctrine might lay a bet
ter, stronger foundation for convincing the fair-minded citizen-in
the-street that judicial intervention was both appropriate and neces44. Application of the general welfare concept is, after all, essentially the doctrine of
substantive due process, which has had scant legitimacy even in more sophisticated profes
sional circles since the demise of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 {1905). While substantive
due process is still encountered fairly often in state courts, the lack of clear standards for its
use ought to send state courts the same warning signals about legitimacy as are so clearly sent
and received under federal law.
45. See John M. Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law:
The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 803, 808-19 {1976).
46. See, e.g., Jerome G. Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Liti
gation, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 851, 865 (1984).
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sary in order to foster a just reordering of society's use of land.47
Without limiting the possibility that other theories might also meet
the test of legitimacy as I discuss it here,48 I propose that the theory
that cries out for reincorporation into the Mount Laurel doctrine is
that of race discrimination.

Race and Exclusionary Zoning
A singular aspect of the first Mount Laurel case is that it totally

eschewed race in favor of economic discrimination as the basis for
its holding, although there was not much doubt, then or now, that
racial concerns play a large part in suburban attitudes toward low
income housing. Hindsight suggests that the court may have made
the wrong choice, at least insofar as protecting its own legitimacy is
concerned. At the time, however, the focus on economic class
rather than race seemed quite inspired. The law of race discrimina
tion was the law of the Federal Equal Protection Clause, and by
1975 law reformers were anxious to keep their cases out of the fed
eral courts to avoid the more restrictive rulings of the post-Warren
Court era. It was also becoming clear that the U.S. Supreme Court
would not prohibit economic discrimination on federal constitu
tional grounds,49 and so placing the Mount Laurel doctrine on
income-related state constitutional grounds made it virtually im
mune to federal court revision. By glossing over race, however, the
New Jersey Supreme Court lost the opportunity to draw the clear
est of moral lines, and hence to defend the legitimacy of its inter
vention on the compelling grounds that Professor Haar urges namely, that the state constitution must be enforced, and the court
must do it if no other institution will.
I do not wish to be nai'.ve about this. I am not suggesting that by
1975, the people of New Jersey had achieved such a state of beatific
colorblindness that we would all have thanked the supreme court
for pointing out the racially discriminatory consequences of subur
ban exclusionary zoning and immediately complied. There would
47. Recall that Professor Haar, too, criticizes the court for failing to explain its constitu
tional theory adequately. See pp. 48-49.
48. I have suggested elsewhere that the shift from passive remedies in Mount Laurel I to
"affirmative" remedies in Mount Laurel II implies that Mount Laurel II is based on an unar
ticulated constitutional right to shelter. See John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary
Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. RE.v. 665,
683 (1996 ). Because of its speculative - some might say grandiose - nature, this theory
might not survive my reformulation of Professor Haar's defense of judicial legitimacy,
although I think my idea can be stated with sufficient clarity and moral force to pass the test.
I do not pursue the right to shelter as an alternative theory here, however, because it is not
fairly within the scope of Professor Haar's book. In any event, judicial legitimacy is for
judges, not law professors; it is our professorial duty to concoct the fanciful ideas out of
which legitimate judicial innovation may eventually result, somewhere way down the line,
and that is the only appropriate context within which a right to shelter can be discussed.
49. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973 ).
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have been a brawl, possibly even a bigger brawl than the one that
ensued over the actual terms of Mount Laurel I. But that reaction,
in whatever form, would have put the defenders of suburban exclu
sionary zoning much more on the defensive than did the actual
Mount Laurel case. By 1975, two decades after Brown v. Board of
Education,50 the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of constitution
ally based racial equality was broadly accepted, even if specific judi
cial decisions remained controversial. Also by 1975, it had become
virtually impossible, except at the extremist fringes, to speak openly
the language of racial discrimination, as had been the case in earlier
decades. "I'm not a racist, but . . . " may still have been a cover for
race-conscious thought, but the norm of legitimate public debate re
quired at least formal adherence to the principle of nondiscrimina
tion that Brown and the civil rights movement had taught us. It
would have been difficult to deny the legitimacy of that principle
when carried over into a race-based theory of the Mount Laurel
doctrine.
From the earliest days of the Mount Laurel doctrine, perceptive
commentators have· recognized the perils of a theory that de
emphasized race.51 Simply put, there are so many more poor White
families than there are poor minority ones that, absent a massive
infusion of resources into producing affordable housing that has not
happened and realistically could not have happened, it was foresee
able that the lion's share of the housing that could be produced
would go first, whenever possible, to White households, which, if
suspect because of their poverty, were nonetheless not so frighten
ing to many middle-class suburbanites as poor Black families.
These concerns came to pass. The available data, although far from
perfect, reveal that minorities have not benefitted from the Mount
Laurel process in anywhere near the proportion that they ought to
have in a colorblind world.52

Race: The Warren Township Opinion
The deemphasis on race also leads Professor Haar into one of
the rare errors of reportage in Suburbs Under Siege. He considers
at some length the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re
Township of Warren,53 in which the court held that the Mount Lau
rel doctrine prohibited municipalities from establishing priorities
50. 347 U.S. 483 {1954 ).
51. See, e.g., Robert C. Holmes, A Black Perspective on Mount Laurel II: Toward a Black
"Fair Share," 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 944 (1984 ).
5 2. See Lamar et al., supra note 21, at 1 256; Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The
Impact of Mt Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis ofthe Characteristics ofApplicants and Occu
pants, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 268, 130 2-05 (1997 ).
53. 6 2 2 A. 2d 1 257 (NJ.1993 ).
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for local - read White - residents in occupying newly available
Mount Laurel units. Haar applauds the decision as evidence of the
court's continued vigor as an engine for law reform. Insofar as the
specific holding is involved, he is correct, but the full story is more
complex and not so encouraging.
The Warren Township plaintiffs initially challenged two provi
sions in the Warren Township substantive certification and pro
posed two separate legal theories to explain how each provision was
invalid. The plaintiffs challenged the residency requirement and, in
addition, a provision in the township's certified plan permitting it to
transfer fifty percent of its Mount Laurel obligation - 166 units of
housing - to New Brunswick through an RCA.54 They alleged
that both provisions violated both the Mount Laurel doctrine and
the race discrimination provisions of the Federal Fair Housing
Act.55 The challengers lost on both issues and on both theories in
the appellate division of superior court, where the case was first
heard, and they appealed to the supreme court. Under New Jersey
practice, there is an appeal as of right only when there is a dissent in
the appellate division, and the dissenting judge in the Warren Town
ship case dissented only on the residency issue. The petitioners
therefore had to seek leave to appeal as to the RCA provision,
which presented the racial issue in its starkest form, as the lower
income housing was being transferred from a virtually all-White
suburb to an urban municipality with a significant minority popula
tion. Because the court had to hear the other branch of the case as
of right, and the petitioners had raised the race issue there as well,
the petitioners were confident that the justices would hear the en
tire case. Not so. The court refused to touch the RCA issue.56
While the court included an extensive - and quite helpful - dic
tum about the applicability of Title VIII to Mount Laurel issues in
the residency preferences opinion, it expressly declined to hold that
the residency preferences violated Title VIII, instead explicitly rest
ing the decision only on the Mount Laurel ground.57
The court, in other words, appears to remain deeply ambivalent
about the relationship between race, exclusionary zoning, and af
fordable housing. The longer I stay in this business, the more con
vinced I become that this is a mistake. Housing mobility is one of
the keys to reducing race consciousness in our society, because mo
bility offers members of minority groups access to the good schools
and good jobs that have built the American middle class and be54. See Warren Township, 6 2 2 A.2d at 1 258-61, 1 278.
55. 4 2 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 {1994). The Fair Housing Act is also known as Title V III of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
56. See 606 A.2d 369 {N.J.199 2) {denying certiorari).
57. See Warren Township, 6 2 2 A.2d at 1 276, 1 277.
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cause racially integrated neighborhoods force all of us to deal with
the race issue as people rather than as stereotypes. Professor
Haar's careful analysis of the legitimacy of judicial activism rein
forces these convictions of mine, because it convinces me that the
morality of a constitutional rule requiring municipalities to exercise
their land-use power in a racially fair way would command broad, if
sometimes grudging, respect as a legitimate exercise of judicial
power. Such a rule therefore would achieve greater and better re
sults than has the complex, hard-to-explain Mount Laurel doctrine.
Alas, however, Professor Haar misses the opportunity to make this
point to the wide audience his book will command, instead giving
the constitutional theory of the Mount Laurel doctrine a more re
spectful obedience than it in fact deserves.
I suggest, in other words, that the legitimacy of judicial activism
in the Mqunt Laurel cases rests on a slender reed, if that reed is
merely the court's interpretation of the general welfare clause of
the New Jersey Constitution. Make no mistake about it, it is the
popular view of legitimacy that counts for these purposes, not the
exquisitely spun theories of scholars and judges, no matter how
convincing those theories may be to other scholars, judges, and pro
fessionals, myself included. So I would add a major qualification to
Professor Haar's exploration of when it is appropriate and neces
sary for courts to intervene in matters of social policy. The legiti
macy of doing so, I would argue, is related directly to the clarity and
precision with which the court can articulate an underlying constitu
tional principle that a fairminded person would find obvious. This
is not to say that soft constitutional principles, such as the general
welfare clause, cannot be enforced or can only be enforced in unag
gressive ways. But a court, mindful of its own finite stock of legiti
macy, should interfere with political choi9es only in proportion to
its confidence that the constitutional mandate is clear and unambig
uous. The general welfare approach of the Mount Laurel cases has
failed this test. In practice, the fair-share rules are too complicated
to be readily understood, too arbitrary and counterintuitive on oc
casion to be perceived as fair - the sprawl problem - and, despite
their superficial objectivity, too subjective to be anchored unam
biguously in the vague language of the constitution.

Representation and Exclusionary Zoning
There is a way to reformulate the general welfare approach,
however, and most of its elements are suggested by Professor
Haar's legitimacy analysis. He argues, for example, that one reason
why judicial activism is appropriate is that it can stimulate a broad
public debate on matters of social policy that might otherwise be
ignored if the status quo of entrenched interest groups is allowed to
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govern (p. 177). He is certainly right about this as a matter of prac
tical politics. One of the great achievements of the Mount Laurel
cases was that they forced the legislature to consider the conse
quences of exclusionary zoning, even though the interest group that
benefited - poor people - was relatively powerless and the inter
est group that was burdened - suburbanites - was the dominant
political voice in statewide politics. As a matter of law, however,
and particularly in providing an argument that judicial intervention
is appropriate and legitimate, Prof�ssor Haar proves too much. If
the source of legitimacy in judicial activism is that the court is en
forcing a constitutional norm, then it would seem to follow that the
constitutional norm provides the answer, not the starting point, for
a new dialogue. If the court is disinterestedly doing what Marbury
courts do - resolving disputes in accordance with law - how much
leeway is there for the legislature, or various pressure groups, to
decide after suitable dialogue not to follow the court's pronounce
ment? Not all that much, if judging in constitutional cases is to re
main judging and not become the work of a council of revision.
Professor Haar also argues for the necessity of judicial interven
tion when political power is territorially dispersed and "[n]o one
agency in front of the court, acting alone, has the governmental au
thority or ability to clear up the situation created by the multitude
of local authorities responsible only to local constituencies" (p.
181). As I noted above, however, it simply is not correct to identify
the judiciary as the only statewide institution capable of bringing a
regional perspective to bear.58 But if we take these two points and
combine them with Professor Haar's further observation that, both
before Mount Laurel I and between Mount Laurels I and II, the
statewide political system was manifestly disinterested in the prob
lem of exclusionary zoning (pp. 177-81), we may then have a way of
defending the legitimacy of the court's general welfare approach.
Approached with a view toward making the application of the
general welfare concept obvious, as I proposed above, the constitu
tional violation that is the essential precondition to Professor
Haar's theory of judicial legitimacy is not the failure to provide
poor people with a "regional fair share" of housing opportunities,
but rather the failure to provide them with a political forum in
which they can fairly compete with other interest groups for their
"fair share" of society's beneficence. Rather than a "dialogue" be
tween the court and the people, as Professor Haar envisions, I sug
gest that the court can and should mandate a fairer dialogue among
the people themselves, all of them, by mandating a reconsideration
of the forum in which the debate takes place. So long as land use
power, and hence the power to control the creation of housing af58. See supra Section: A Theory of Judicial Activism.
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fordable to lower-income groups, is delegated to municipalities un
conditionally, those municipalities will have not only the power to
exclude bun the ability to ignore the voices of those now excluded.
The constitutional right that is implicated in this approach to the
problem of exclusionary zoning is the right to have fair participa
tion in the political process - the right, as the late Richard
Babcock described it, to play "the zoning game"59 on the same
playing field as everyone else. The remedy for such a reformulated
right is much more straightforward than the substantive implemen
tation of "fair share" rules that has preoccupied the Mount Laurel
process for the last twenty years. All that is required is that the
court order the state to reclaim the delegated zoning power from
the gaggle of fragmented, parochial municipalities and either exer
cise the power itself, redelegate it to new state or regional planning
agencies, or redelegate it to municipalities subject to tighter stan
dards that protect the interests of prospective as well as present res
idents of the decisionmaking community.60 This is, undoubtedly, a
softer remedy than the Mount Laurel fair-share rules, if those rules
were fully implemented, but that of course is the point. By building
a very aggressive judicial remedy on a hard-to-explain constitu
tional base, the supreme court virtually guaranteed that controversy
would be maximized and that much of the focus of the controversy
would be shifted to the supposed illegitimacy of judicial activism,
rather than remaining where it belongs, on the callousness of ignor
ing the needs of poor people. The representation theory, by con
trast, would justify judicial activism on a ground that fair-minded
people could understand and accept - namely, that in a democracy
the willingness to lose a political fight depends on having the
chance to win the battle on some other occasion. Under the regime
of exclusionary zoning, that could not happen.61
59.

See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME

(1966).

60. I made this argument to no avail more than twenty years ago. See Payne, supra note
45. The majority opinion in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d
1192, 1219 n.41 (N.J. 1977), characterized that argument as "a highly novel idea" but did not
suggest following it. The supreme court also took note of the approach during the briefing
that led up to Mount Laurel II, see John M. Payne, Housing Rights and Remedies: A "Legis
lative" History of Mount Laurel II, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 889, 899-900, 931 (1984), but
none of the parties was willing to embrace it and the court made no mention of it in the
subsequent opinion.
61. I am grateful to my colleague, Professor Eric Neisser, for pointing out an interesting
parallel to this argument. The recent controversy involving the President's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy on gays in the military and the passage through Congress at lightning
speed of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1994 & Supp.
1997), indicate that Americans remain deeply troubled about departures from traditional
norms of sexuality. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court's decision two years ago in Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996), striking down a Colorado initiative that effectively denied proponents of
gay rights access to conventional political processes, caused barely a ripple of protest. Fair
process, it would seem, has independent value in the American system.
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Arguably, the representation approach that I am suggesting can
be teased out of the history of the Mount Laurel doctrine. As Pro
fessor Haar's narrative describes quite accurately, the ·New Jersey
Supreme Court and its three designated trial judges, after the requi
site period of Sturm und Drang, convinced the politicians of New
Jersey that the Mount Laurel decision would be enforced vigor
ously. In the face of judicial orders rezoning specific towns, the leg
islature put aside traditional home rule concerns and created a
state-level decisionmaking institution, the Council on Affordable
Housing, which brings together - imperfectly - municipal and
housing advocates to hash out ground rules within which municipal
ities must then act in the exercise of their delegated zoning powers,
though compliance with the Act is voluntary. As a housing advo
cate, I now have a political forum within which to lobby, scheme,
and intrigue, just as any other interest group does, with recourse to
the cabinet officer who oversees COAH and, on those occasions
when the stakes are high enough - usually just before an election
- to the office of the governor herself.
But at what cost was this access purchased? Instead of the dec
ade of heated debate about the legitimacy of the court's acting at all
- a debate the continuing legacy of which is evident in that the
phrase "Mount Laurel" still arouses knee-jerk opposition - might
it not have been preferable to have attended more carefully to the
legitimacy problems up front, fashioning the doctrine to maximize
both its legitimacy and its effectiveness? Of course, this is hind
sight. Given the choice of repeating the Mount Laurel process as it
was or doing nothing at all, I unhesitatingly would cast my vote with
Justice Hall and Chief Justice Wilentz and Professor Haar. But we
do have the benefit of hindsight, and I would caution the reader
understandably swept up in the enthusiasm of Professor Haar's
commitment to judicial activism to take his defense of judicial legit
imacy as a starting point rather than a roadmap, at least insofar as
Mount Laurel is Exhibit A .62

Selling Judicial Activism
Finally, let me comment briefly on Professor Haar's third over
arching theme, the failure of the New Jersey judiciary to explain
adequately its Mount Laurel doctrine to the. public, to convince
them of its legitimacy and, correlatively, of the legitimacy of the
court itself. While I certainly share Haar's view that the Mount
6 2. The argument for the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of race-based equality is in
dependent of the representation argument made here. The mandate for racial equality has a
strong, explicit foundation in the federal and state constitutions and is not subject to a popu
lar override to the extent that less explicitly protected interests may be. See, e.g., Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S.385 (1969 ) (holding unconstitutional a referendum on open housing Jaw ).
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a public relations disaster,63 I disagree with his
argument that the court should have waded more vigorously into
the world of talk shows and op-ed columns. To be fair to Professor
Haar, I do not think that that degree of engagement is what he has
in mind. But that in tum is my underlying point, for selling a con
troversial issue is an all-or-nothing process. Politics is a tough busi
ness, as I learned when I strayed from the classroom and the
courtroom to lobby on behalf of affordable housing issues - and
specifically in opposition to a constitutional amendment that would
have reversed Mount Laurel. A state senator once reprimanded me
at a public hearing for having the temerity to oppose his anti-Mount
Laurel bill, on the grounds-that as a teacher at the state university, I
worked for the legislature and should therefore obey the boss's that is, his - lead. Imagine how judges would fare in even the
outer orbits of this world - keeping in mind, as Professor Haar
points out, that Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice Pollock both ran
into reconfirmation troubles as a result of their participation in the
Mount Laurel case.
The problem, ultimately, is the same problem of judicial legiti
macy. In order for judges to act boldly, as both Professor Haar and
I believe they should, they must convince the public at large that
they are acting within the special competence of judges, rather than
as unelected - and therefore illegitimate - politicians. Selling
their product ultimately connects judges to the political, rather than
to the judicial, side of our system of governance and thus undercuts
their legitimacy. Hence my preceding argument: reformist, activist
judges must place their decisions on clearly understandable and
easily ,acceptable bases, such as fair representation or racial equity,
so that the decisions sell themselves.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, then, I disagree with Professor Haar's celebration of
the role that private litigants can play in structural reform litigation,
and I have reservations about the extent to which the Mount Laurel
doctrine, as actually formulated and defended, can sustain all of his
claims for the legitimacy of judicial activism. The two criticisms,
moreover, are related: the perceived self-interest of private
builder-litigants undercuts the perceived legitimacy of the entire
process, particularly when the absence of public-interest litigants
requires the judges to rely extensively on planning masters to gain a
balanced picture. 64 When the process no longer looks very much
like litigation, doubters are more likely to ask why the decision be63. This is my phrase, not Haar's. See John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judi
cial Enforcement ofAffordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EsTATE L.J. 20, 27 (1987).
64. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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longs to an - unelected - judge at all. Law reform is still law,
even if the law in question is heavily infused with policy and plan
ning expertise.
But it is also important to emphasize our broad areas of agree
ment. I fully agree that there is a legitimate role for the courts to
play in stimulating social reform
I do not subscribe, in other
words, to the "hollow hope" thesis,65 because I have seen the re
sults in New Jersey - and I also agree that there is a great deal of
room for creative thinking about the role of private actors in the
process. Inclusionary zoning is a marvelous addition to the arma
ment of a housing advocate, so long as it is the public interest that
controls and not the private developer. Professor Haar's detailed
and thoughtful exploration of the Mount Laurel story helped me to
focus on how much has been achieved and how much remains to be
done. His work offers the start of a dialogue that can result in a
further refinement of the Mount Laurel doctrine, that can suggest
new and better ways to defend it, and that ultimately can take the
cause of fair housing to heights yet unimagined.
-

65.
CIAL

See GERALD N.RosENBERG, THE HOLLOW HoPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT So.
CHANGE? (1991).

